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Freedom of movement and of residence 
 
1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States. 
2. Freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the 
Treaties, to nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a 
Member State. 
 
Explanation on Article 45 [from OJ 2007 C 303] 
 
The right guaranteed by paragraph 1 is the right guaranteed by Article 20(2)(a) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (cf. also the legal base in Article 21; 
and the judgment of the Court of Justice of 17 September 2002, Case C-413/99 
Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091). In accordance with Article 52(2) of the Charter, those 
rights are to be applied under the conditions and within the limits defined by the 
Treaties. 
 
Paragraph 2 refers to the power granted to the Union by Articles 77, 78 and 79 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Consequently, the granting of this 
right depends on the institutions exercising that power. 
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A. Field of Application of Article 45  
 
Title V of the Charter, by and large, reproduces provisions of the TEU/TFEU. For this 
reason, it has been criticised in that its provisions appear, at least at first sight, to be 
redundant. This is especially the case in relation to Article 45 Charter which, as other 
provisions in the same title, is addressed only to citizens (para 1), or provides no 
substantive right (para 2). Its first paragraph reproduces Article 20(2)(a)TFEU, 
 2 
providing a right to move and reside for Union citizens; pursuant to Article 52(2) 
Charter any TFEU/TEU Treaty derived right must be exercised ‘under the conditions 
and within the limits’ defined by the relevant Treaty itself, hence excluding, bar some 
very creative interpretation, any autonomous life for Treaty derived Charter rights. 
 
Article 45(2), on the other hand, seems tautological: given that the Charter does not 
modify, or affect, the repartition of competences between Member States and Union,
1
 
the fact that the Charter provides that a competence conferred by the Treaties on the 
Union ‘may be’ exercised appears to add very little to the status quo. 
 
Be as it may, this is not to deny the absolute centrality of the free movement rights for 
the European integration project, both the most tangible and the most successful rights 
conferred by the Treaty (and now also by the Charter) on individuals. Furthermore, it 
is the exercise of these rights that might act as a trigger for the enjoyment of Union 
fundamental rights,
2
 whether as general principles or as Charter rights. And the very 
inclusion of EU Citizens’ rights in the Charter confirms the gradual shift, first 
rendered explicit in the Maastricht Treaty with the creation of Union citizenship, from 




B. Interrelationship of Article 45 with other provisions of the Charter 
 
The impact of Article 45 Charter appears to be very limited: first of all, only Article 
45 (1) is justiciable; secondly, given that it reproduces a Treaty right, it just reinforces 
existing obligations already binding both on the European Union institutions; and on 
the Member States. Indeed, the Treaty right is more wide-ranging than the Charter 
equivalent since it is a free standing right, i.e. it can be exercised autonomously 
without the need to establish any other link with EU law (as it is the case for Charter 
rights). In fact, it is through the exercise of the Treaty free movement provisions that 




The Charter provisions most relevant to Article 45 are Articles 15 and 21. In 
particular, Article 15(2) Charter provides for the right of Union citizens to seek 
employment or/and work as employed or self-employed in any of the Member States. 
Article 21(2) Charter, on the other hand, reproduces the prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of nationality within the scope of application of the Treaties. As we shall 
see in more detail below, the rights granted by Article 45 Charter encompass also the 
right to move in order to seek or take up employment/self-employed activity; and, one 
                                                 
1
 See Art 6 TEU and Article 51(2) Charter. 
2
 EU Fundamental rights, and now the Charter, apply to national rules only insofar as the Member State 
is implementing EU law, or acting within its scope. The latter situation arises when an act of the State 
is derogating or limiting one of the rights of free movement (see e.g. Case C-260/89 ERT  ECR I-2925; 
Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9709). Hence, the free movement rights have also been used with 
the sole aim of enforcing fundamental rights claim against the Member States, see e.g. Case C-60/00 
Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279.   
3
 See also G De Bùrca “Human Rights: the Charter and Beyond” Jean Monnet Working Papers, 2001, 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/01/013601.html. 
4
 Following the proclamation of the Charter there were some doubts whether its provisions applied to 
Member States only when they implemented EU law (as the text of Art 51 seems to suggest) or also 
when they act within the scope of EU law, as the Court’s case law and logic would demand. The 
explanations to Article 51 also indicated the latter as the correct interpretation; this has now been 
confirmed by the Court, see e.g. Case C-256/11 Dereci, judgment of 15 November 2011, nyr. 
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of the most tangible benefits arising from the right to move is the ability to claim, 
(though not necessarily to obtain), equal treatment in relation to almost all matters, 
including social security and welfare provision.  
 
On the other hand, Article 52 (2) Charter limits the possibility for an autonomous ‘life’ 
of Article 45; the former provision states that Treaty derived rights ‘shall be exercised 
under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties’. As we shall see 
in more detail below, those limits include both the limitations contained in the Treaty 
itself; and the limitations contained in secondary legislation, and especially in 
Directive 2004/38.
5
  Article 52(1) Charter, the general derogation clause, provides 
that all limitations to Charter rights must meet the necessity and proportionality 
requirements. In relation to the free movement provisions, the same requirements 




C. Sources of Article 45 Rights 
 
As mentioned above, and as clarified in the explanations, Article 45(1) Charter 
reproduces verbatim Article 20(2)(a) TFEU. The right to move and reside within the 
territory of the Member States was first introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, before 
then movement being a prerogative of those economically active.
7
 As we shall see in 
more detail below, the right to move and reside in Member States is qualified in 
Article 21 TFEU, which refers to ‘limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty 
and by the measures adopted to give them effect’. The most relevant ‘limitations and 
conditions’ are those contained in Directive 2004/38, which are the focus of detailed 
examination further below. Movement rights can also be limited for reasons of public 




Article 45 (2) refers to the power granted to the Union by Title V (Part III) of the 
TFEU in relation to migration and movement of third country nationals. It should be 
recalled that the United Kingdom and Ireland – unless they make an ad hoc decision 
to the contrary – and Denmark do not take part in those measures.9 Consequently, 
even should Article 45(2) Charter be found to be more than merely declaratory, its 
application would be confined to the EU institutions and to those Member States 




                                                 
5
 Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L 229/35, (hereinafter Directive 2004/38). 
6
 See in relation to citizenship residency rights, e.g.  Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-
7091.  
7
 It should be noted that ‘passive economic actors’, i.e. those whose economic link consists in parting 
with money, and in particular tourists, were afforded some protection by Article 56 TFEU which 
extended to service recipients following the ruling in Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and 
Carbone [1984] ECR 377; for tourists see e.g. Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195; Case C-45/93 
Commission v Spain [1994] ECR I-911. Even following the introduction of Union Citizenship, the 
Court relied on Article 56 TFEU in order to establish a link with the Treaty and afford equal treatment 
in relation to court proceedings in Case C-274/96 H O Bickel and V Franz [1998] ECR I-1121.  
8
 See Directive 2004/38 as well as Articles 45(3) and 52(1) TFEU. 
9
 See Protocol 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom 
security and justice; and Protocol 22 on the position of Denmark .  
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I. General Remarks  
 
The significance of Article 45 seems to be rather limited since the Charter applies 
only to the EU Institutions and to the Member States when they are implementing 
Union law. As a result, Article 45 could be relevant in the review of acts of the EU 
institutions, but since the latter are in any event bound by the Treaty, and since Treaty 
provisions are lex specialis, it is very unlikely that challenges to the legality of EU 
acts would be based on the Charter rather than the TFEU. The same can be said in 
relation to Member States implementing Union law. For the rest, the Charter does not 
grant free standing rights; rather the enjoyment of those rights is conditional upon the 
individual having established a link with Union law, link which is most commonly 
created through the exercise of one of the free movement or citizenship rights 
contained in the TFEU. It is hence very difficult to foresee circumstances where 
Article 45 Charter could be usefully relied upon by individuals.  
 
II. Scope of Application – Article 45 (1) 
 
The free movement rights contained in Article 45 Charter are dependent upon 
possession of Union citizenship; this in turn is, for the time being, conditional upon 
possession of the nationality of one of the Member States. Consistently, the Court has 
clarified that it is for national law alone to determine who is a citizen;
10
 more 
controversially, the Court has also held that the withdrawal of national citizenship 
might fall within the scope of Union law, and hence be subjected to scrutiny in 
relation to proportionality and fundamental rights, if it entails the loss of Union 





The right to move and reside within the EU is subject to the requirements contained in 
the Treaty and in secondary legislation, especially the conditions now detailed in 
Directive 2004/38. When approaching the analysis of the free movement rights a 
caveat is necessary: those rights are conferred to Union citizens directly by the Treaty 
(and now by the Charter); this means that any limitation or condition imposed on the 
exercise or enjoyment of those rights by either the Member States or the Union 
legislature must be necessary and proportionate;
12
 and must not deprive the 




III. Right to move, right to enter and right to exit 
 
                                                 
10
 And it is for national law alone to determine who is a citizen, Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR 
I-4239; Case C-192/99 R v SofS for the Home Department Ex p. Kaur [2001] ECR I-1237; C-200/02 
Chen v SofS for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-9925. 
11
 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449; on the broader constitutional significance of the 
Rottmann decision see D Kochenov and R Plender “EU Citizenship: from an incipient form to an 
incipient substance? The discovery of the Treaty text” (2012) 37 ELRev 369; and T Konstadines “La 
Fraternité Européenne? The extent of national competence to condition the acquisition and loss of 
nationality from the perspective of EU citizenship” (2010) 35 ELRev 401.   
12
 E.g. Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091; see also below section IV (b). 
13
 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177. 
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All Union citizens have a right to move freely across the territory of the Union, upon 
production of a valid document.
14
 No exit/entry visas or similar can be imposed on 
Union citizens; visas might be imposed on third country national family members, 
although those are obtained as a matter of right and not as a matter of discretion.
15
 
The only reasons why Member States might limit the right of Union citizens and their 
family members to exit/enter their territory are those listed in the Treaty and detailed 
in Directive 2004/38: public policy, public security and public health. The latter can 
be used to justify a limit to movement only in the first three months of residence and 
solely for infectious diseases listed by the World Health Organisation.
16
 As we shall 
see in more detail below, public policy and public security are also narrowly 
construed.
17
 Furthermore, limits to the right to move must always satisfy the 
proportionality test so that the longer the stay of the Union citizen in the host country 




It should be noted that Directive 2004/38 applies only to Union citizens who “move to 
or reside in a Member State other than that of which they are national’,19 so that 
actions against the citizen’s own Member State continue to be covered exclusively by 
the TFEU.
20
 The issue of whether the Treaty provisions, and the Charter by 
implication, might be invoked lacking the cross-border element, i.e. in purely internal 
situations, is an open one.
21
 
   
IV.  Right to reside 
 
The Union citizen’s right to reside ‘freely’ within the territory of the Member States is 
heavily qualified: following the introduction of Directive 2004/38 there are three 
                                                 
14
 See generally Chapter II Directive 2004/38. Failure to produce a document is not in itself a sufficient 
reason for the Member State to deny admission; rather the national authorities have to give the Union 
citizen (and her family member) reasonable time to prove identity (or family ties); see Article 5(4) 
Directive 2004/38 and Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591.  
15
 It should be noted that Directive 2004/38 grants rights to residence and equal treatment also to third 
country national family members, as listed in article in Article 2(2) Directive 2004/38; however, the 
scope of application of Article 45 (1) Charter is more limited as it applies only to Union citizens.  
16
 See Article 29 Directive 2004/38. 
17
 See Arts 27 and ff Directive 2004/38; but recently CJ EU has been more lenient in accepting 
deportation for public policy/security reasons; see below footnote 62. 
18
 See Art 28 Directive 2004/38 which also provides a different regime for permanent residents, who 
can be expelled only on ‘serious’ grounds of public policy and security; and for Union citizens who 
have stayed in the host country longer than 10 years, who can only be expelled on ‘imperative’ grounds 
of public policy and security. Surprisingly, the Court has interpreted those conditions less strictly than 
previous case law might have suggested, see e.g. Case C-348/09 P.I. v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt 
Remscheid, judgment of 22 May 2012, nyr.   
19
 Article 3(1) Directive 2004/38. 
20
 Cf also Case 175/78 R v Saunders [1979] ECR 1129;  
21
 See e.g. E Spaventa “Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and its 
Constitutional Effects” (2008) CMLRev 13; C Dautricourt and S Thomas “Reverse discrimination and 
free movement of persons under Community law: all for Ulysses, nothing for Penelope?” (2009) 34 
ELRev 433; A Lansbergen and N Miller “European citizenship rights in internal situations: an 
ambiguous revolution? Decision of 8 March 2011, Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office 
national de l'emploi (ONEM)” (2011) 7 ECL Rev 287; P. Van Elsuwege “European Union Citizenship 
and the Purely Internal Rule Revisited: Decision of 5 May 2011, Case C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department” (2011) 7 ECL Rev 308. 
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different types of residence rights, which very much depend on duration of stay.
22
 The 
only truly ‘free’ right to reside is that of short term visitors, 23 i.e. Union citizens that 
travel to another Member State for a period of less than three months (which accounts 
for the great majority of movement within the Union).
24
 In this case, no condition can 
be imposed on visitors and they enjoy a qualified right to equal treatment, which 
excludes them from entitlement to social assistance.
25
 Furthermore, the right to stay of 
short term visitors can be terminated if they become an unreasonable burden on the 
social assistance system of the host Member State.
26
   
 
Union citizens wishing to move and reside in another Member State for more than 3 
months have to satisfy given requirements: either (a) they must be economically 
active; or (b) they must be economically independent, i.e. possess sufficient resources 
and comprehensive health insurance so as not to become an unreasonable burden on 
the host welfare system. After 5 years of lawful residence,
27
 Union citizens gain a 
right to permanent residence which is unconditional (i.e. no requirement to be 




a) Economically active migrants  
 
Union Citizens who move in order to seek or exercise an economic activity as 
employed or self-employed enjoy an unconditional right to move and reside in any of 
the Member States,
29
 coupled with a full right to equal treatment.
30
 The rights for 
economically active migrants were included in the Treaty from its inception, being at 
the core of the European integration project, and were supplemented by generous 
                                                 
22
 This has been very appropriately termed ‘incremental approach’ to citizenship rights by C Barnard, 
“EU Citizenship and the Principle of Solidarity”, in M Dougan and E Spaventa (eds)  Social Welfare 
and EU Law  (Hart Publishing, 2005), p 157, at 166.  
23
 Article 6 Directive 2004/38.  
24
 For statistical data see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Tourism_trends, 
for tourism; and compare with data on internal migration available on 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_stat
istics; last accessed 15
th
 February 2013.  
25
 See Article 24(2) Directive 2004/38; social assistance has been interpreted very narrowly in the 
context of work seekers, see Joined Cases C-22 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] ECR 
I-4585, although it is doubtful whether that interpretation would extent to visitors who have no link 
with the employment market.   
26
 Article 14(1) Directive 2004/38; however pursuant to paragraph 3 of the same article, expulsion can 
never be the automatic consequence of recourse to social assistance. 
27
 The Court has clarified that lawful residence before accession of the Union Citizen’s home State to 
the EU might be taken into account towards the 5 years provided the conditions contained in the 
Directive were satisfied during the (prior) stay; see e.g. Case C-424 and 425/10 Ziolkowski et al, 
judgment of 21 December 2011, nyr; Joined Cases C-147 and 148/11 Czop and Punakova, judgment of 
6 September 2012, nyr. The same reasoning applies to periods of residence accrued before the deadline 
for transposition of Directive 2004/38 expired (30 April 2006), see case C-162/09 Lassal [2010] ECR 
9217. 
28
 See Art 24 Directive 2004/38. 
29
 They are also protected upon returning to their home country, e.g.  Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR 
I-4265, and see below section V. 
30
 In relation to work seekers those rights are somehow more limited; if the work seeker has not secured 
a job within 3months of arrival they might be asked to prove that they are still looking for, and have a 
genuine chance of finding, employment (Article 14(4)b). As mentioned above work seekers do not 
enjoy a full right of equal treatment, see Article 24(2) Directive 2004/38. 
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provisions contained in secondary legislation.
31
 The free movement rights were 
innovative and ambitious for their time, granting an unqualified right to work in any 
of the Member States without being discriminated on grounds of nationality and 
without having to satisfy any immigration requirement (including work permits of any 
sort);
32
 the right to access social assistance and welfare provision in the host-State on 
equal basis to own nationals;
33
 and granting extensive rights to migrants’ family 
members, including educational rights for their children.
34
 Furthermore, and in 
keeping with its teleological interpretation of the Treaty, the Court of Justice, from the 
very beginning, gave a broad interpretation to the personal and material scope of those 
rights. For instance, in order to be protected by the free movement of workers, 
freedom of establishment or free movement of services provisions, the Union citizens 
must perform (or receive) services for remuneration, since an ‘economic’ element is a 
precondition for the enjoyment of those rights. However, the Court was satisfied that 
whilst an element of remuneration is always necessary in order to be qualified as 
worker or self-employed, this might take the form of remuneration in kind (e.g. board 
and lodging) rather than be limited to monetary compensation.
35
 Similarly, whilst in 
order to be covered by the Treaty a service needs to be an ‘economic service’, i.e. a 
service provided for remuneration, it is immaterial whether the remuneration is paid 
by the recipient or by a third party. What matters is that someone at some stage has 
paid for it.
36
 The quantum of remuneration is also irrelevant, provided that the 
economic activity is genuine and not marginal or ancillary. For this reason, part-time 
workers, even when working only a few hours a week, are included in the notion of 
‘worker’,37 and as such have access to all welfare benefits on equal grounds to own-
citizens. This means, of course, that the host welfare system can be relied upon by 
                                                 
31
 E.g. Directive 64/221on  the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement and 
residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
health[1964] OJ Sp ed 117;  Regulation 1612/68 on the freedom of movement of workers within the 
Community [1968(1)] OJ Sp ed 475; Directive 68/360 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families [1968(I)] OJ Sp Ed 
485; Directive 73/148 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services, 
[1973] OJ L172/14. All of the above legislation but for Regulation 1612/68 has been repealed by 
Directive 2004/38. 
32
 Originally Arts 48, 52 and 59 EEC, Directive 68/360 on the abolition of restrictions on movement 
and residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families [1968(I)] OJ Sp 
Ed 485; Directive 73/148 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services, 
[1973] OJ L172/14. 
33
 Art 7 (2) Reg 1612/68. 
34
 See art 12 Reg 1612/68; this has been generously interpreted so that a parent no longer working can 
gain a right to reside as a result of their children’s right to continue education in the host Member State, 
eg Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065; Case C-480/08 Texeira [2010] ECR I-1107; Joined 
Cases C-147 and 148/11 Czop and Punakova, judgment of 6 September 2012, nyr, which also clarified 
that the same reasoning does not apply if the parent is/was self-employed.  
35
 Case 196/87 Steymann [1988] ECR 6159;  
36
 Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders [1988] ECR 2085;on the other hand if the economic element is 
lacking, the Treaty free movement of service provisions do not apply; see Case C-159/90 Grogan 
[1991] ECR I-4685. This is also true in relation to the resources necessary to gain a right to reside in 
relation to economically inactive people: there the Court has held that such resources can be provided 
by a third party dismissing the Member State’s objection that that would leave the Union citizen (and 
hence the host-State)  more vulnerable to a change in circumstance; see Case C-408/03 Commission v 
Belgium (citizenship) [2006] ECR I-2647; and also Case C-200/02 Chen and others [2004] ECR I-
9925.   
37
 E.g. Case 53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 1035; Case 139/85, Kempf [1986] ECR 1741. 
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those workers who earn less than the minimum wage/threshold and who would then 
qualify for means tested benefits.    
 
As mentioned above, an economic migrant benefits from a full right to equal 
treatment in relation to all matters covered by the Treaty; this right not to be 
discriminated on grounds of nationality has been interpreted broadly, to encompass 
both discrimination in law (direct discrimination) and in fact (indirect discrimination).  
In particular, the latter concept has been pivotal to eradicate barriers resulting from 
long standing regulatory habits, and the Court has made clear that neither intention, 
nor statistical information are relevant for a finding of indirect discrimination. Rather, 
it held that “conditions imposed by national law must be regarded as indirectly 
discriminatory where, although applicable irrespective of nationality, they affect 
essentially migrant workers (…) or the great majority of those affected are migrant 
workers (…), where they are indistinctly applicable but can more easily be satisfied 
by national workers than by migrant workers (…) or where there is a risk that they 
may operate to the particular detriment of migrant workers”.38 The right not to be 
discriminated against encompasses also the right to equal treatment in relation to 
welfare benefits and social assistance, so that any benefit payable by virtue of an 
individual's status as a worker or residence on national territory, where the extension 
of the benefit to nationals of other Member States might facilitate free movement of 
workers protection, is also available to economic migrants.
 39
 Furthermore, the Court 
also included, at least to a certain extent, work-seekers in the notion of ‘worker’, to 
ensure that work-seekers would benefit from the right to move to another Member 
State in order to seek employment.
40
 This case law has now been codified in Directive 
2004/38 so that those looking for a job can move without having to satisfy any 
additional requirement; and can stay beyond the initial three months provided they 
continue to seek employment and have a genuine chance of being engaged.
41
 Pursuant 
to Article 24(2) Directive 2004/38, Member States are not obliged to confer 
entitlement to social assistance to work seekers; however, the Court has interpreted 
this exception narrowly and held that a benefit aimed at facilitating access to the 





If economically active migrants have always enjoyed protection in EU law, the 
situation is different for non-economically active citizens; as mentioned above, their 
Treaty status is of more recent derivation, and their rights are the result of an 
extensive hermeneutic effort by the Court. Whilst, at first, Member States appeared 
rather suspicious of this expansive jurisprudential interpretation, some even 
questioning whether the citizenship provisions introduced by the Maastricht Treaty 
                                                 
38
 See for a comprehensive definition of the right not to be discriminated on grounds of nationality 
Case C-237/94 John O’Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617, para 18. 
39
 The Court held that Article 7(2) Reg 1612/68;  Case 207/78 Even [1979] ECR 2019. In Case 59/85 
Reed [1986] ECR 1283, the Court interpreted the concept of equal treatment in social advantages 
encompasses equal treatment in relation to residency rights of one’s partner/spouse.    
40
 See Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] ECR 2811, which held that work seekers did not enjoy a right to 
equal treatment in relation to social advantages; the case law then developed in light of the introduction 
of Union citizenship in Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703, see generally M Dougan ‘Free 
Movement: the Workseeker as a Citizen’ (2001) 4 CYELS 94.  
41
 Cf Article 14(4)b Directive 2004/38. 
42
 C-22/08 Vatsouras [2009] ECR I-4585. 
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bestowed any new rights at all,
43
 slowly the case law came to be accepted and was 
eventually codified in its entirety in Directive 2004/38. We will limit our analysis to 
the residence rights of non-economically active citizens; when considering the 
limitations and conditions imposed on movement for this class of citizens, it should be 
remembered that the legislature and the Court are attempting to strike a difficult 
balance: on the one hand, the introduction of Union citizenship was the result of a 
new stage in integration where the European project emancipated itself, at least 
partially, from its predominant (if not exclusive) economic roots. On the other hand, 
the ambitions of citizenship have to be reconciled with the reality of the nation state, 
and especially of welfare provision still divided across national lines.
44
 The result is a 
compromise between rhetoric and reality, so that whilst important progress has been 
made (not least the Charter), rights in European law are still conditional upon the 
satisfaction of a multiplicity of requirements which, inevitably, privilege certain 
categories of people (able and/or wealthy migrants) over others (static citizens; 




b) Economically inactive citizens: Union citizenship in the case law of the 
Court 
 
In order to understand the rights of non-economically active citizens, it is necessary to 
briefly recall the development of such rights in the case law of the Court since, as 
mentioned above, it is this case law that provided the basis for codification in 





At the time when the Maastricht Treaty was adopted, non-economically active Union 
citizens derived their rights of residence from three residency directives which 
subjected the right to reside upon the possession of sufficient resources and 
comprehensive health insurance, so that the migrant Union citizen would not become 
an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the public finances of the host Member State.47 Since 
Article 21 TFEU (and Article 8a Maastricht Treaty before then) explicitly subjects the 
                                                 
43
 See e.g. the submissions of the French and British Governments in Case C-85/96 M M Martínez Sala 
v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691, as summarised by AG La Pergola esp at paras 15 and ff.  
44
 On Union citizenship and welfare provision see e.g. M Dougan and E Spaventa (eds) Social Welfare 
and EU Law (Hart Publishing Oxford 2005) and G de Búrca (ed) EU Law and the Welfare State. In 
Search of Solidarity (OUP Oxford 2005); U Neergaard, R Nielsen and L M Roseberry (eds) The Role 
of Courts in Developing a European Social Model: Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives 
(2010 Copenhagen DOJ publishing); M Ross and Y Borgmann-Prebil (eds) Promoting Solidarity in 
the European Union (OUP 2010); R C A White “Social Solidarity and Social Security” in A Arnull, C 
Barnard, M Dougan and E Spaventa (eds) A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in 
Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart Publishing 2011), 301. 
45
 On these issues see also M Ross “The Struggle for EU Citizenship: Why Solidarity Matters” in A 
Arnull, C Barnard, M Dougan and E Spaventa (eds) A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU 
Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart Publishing 2011), 283; and more generally N Nic Shuibhne 
“The Resiliance of EU Market Citizenship” (2010) 47 CMLRev 1597. 
46
 On the complex interaction between Treaty free movement provisions and secondary legislation see 
e.g. K Engsig Sorensen “Reconciling secondary legislation with the Treaty rights of free movement” 
(2011) 36 ELRev 339. 
47
 Directive 90/364 on a general right to residence [1990] O.J. L180/26 (hereinafter Directive 90/364); 
Directive 90/365 on retired persons [1990] O.J. L180/28 (hereinafter Directive 90/365); Directive 
93/96 on students [1993] O.J. L317/59 (hereinafter Directive 93/96); as said above tourists were (and 
are) also protected under the provisions relating to the free movement of services; see above footnote 7.   
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right of residence and movement to the limitations and conditions contained therein 
and in secondary legislation, most Member States believed that the citizenship 
movement and residence rights introduced in the Treaty were not innovative,
48
 rather 





The Court, however, followed a different path, and in a series of judgments found that 
the right to move enshrined in Article 21 TFEU was capable of triggering the right to 
equal treatment (also in relation to welfare benefits).
50
 Finally, in the case of 
Baumbast,
51
 the Court also recognised that the citizenship provisions bestowed upon 
Union citizens a directly effective right of residence in other Member States. This 
right could legitimately be subjected to limitations and conditions contained in 
secondary legislation, amongst which the requirements of economic self-sufficiency 
and comprehensive health insurance. However, given ‘the fundamental status’ of 
Union citizenship, the Member States had to apply those conditions having due regard 
to the principle of proportionality and fundamental rights. In this way, the Court 
sought to balance the ambitions of supranational citizenship with the budgetary reality 
of welfare states funded by national communities. As a result, several elements must 
be taken into account to determine the actual ‘quantum’ of rights of the individual 
migrant: the link with the host community;
52
 the nature (economic or not) of the 
request;
53
 and ultimately whether the migrant is a ‘deserving’ one, whether her 





It is open to debate whether this rather Victorian approach to citizenship entitlement, 
which juxtaposes the ‘deserving’ to the ‘undeserving’ citizen, often merely on 
grounds of wealth, is to be welcomed; or whether it further promotes integration as an 
essentially elitist project. Be as it may, the compromise made by the Court is fully 
incorporated in the provisions of Directive 2004/38, which repealed most of the 
relevant pre-existing secondary legislation.   
 
                                                 
48
 See submissions of the French and British Governments in Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR 
I-2691, as summarised by AG La Pergola esp at paras 15 and ff.  
49
 On the other hand, the scholarship had already identified in the free movement of workers provisions 
(pre Maastricht) the nucleus of an incipient European citizenship, see e.g. E. Meehan Citizenship and 
the European Community (Sage Publications, 1993); D O’Keeffe “Union Citizenship” in D O’Keeffe 
and PM Twomey (eds) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law London 1994), ch 6.   
50
 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691, and see S O’Leary “Putting flesh on the bones of 
European Union citizenhip” (1999) 24 ELRev 68; Case C-184/99 R Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193 ; 
Case C-224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191. 
51
 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091, and see M Dougan and E Spaventa “Educating 
Rudy and the (non-)English patient: A double-bill on residency rights under Article18 EC” (2003) 28 
ELRev 699. 
52
 E.g. C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703; Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119; on the notion 
of real link see C O’Brien “Real links, abstract rights and false alarms: the relationship between the 
ECJ’s “real link” case law and national solidarity” (2008) 33 ELRev 643. 
53
 E.g. Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091. 
54
 This said, the Court has taken a slightly stricter, and perhaps surprising, approach in Case C-158/07 
Förster [2008] ECR I-8507, noted O Golynker (2009) 46 CMLRev 2021; S O’Leary ‘Equal treatment 
and EU citizens: A new chapter on cross-border educational mobility and access to student financial 
assistance’ (2009) 34 ELRev 612. 
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i) The right to reside and the right to equal treatment of economically 
inactive citizens  
 
As said above, pursuant to the provisions of Directive 2004/38 economically inactive 
citizens have a qualified right to reside in a Member State other than that of their 
nationality.
55
 If a citizen meets the requirements of sufficient resources and 
comprehensive health insurance, the right to reside is automatic, and can only be 
refused on public health, public policy or public security grounds. However, if the 
citizen does not satisfy all of the requirements provided for by the Directive, they 
might be able to claim a right to reside in another Member State pursuant to the 
Treaty provisions (Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, reproduced in the Charter); whether, in 
practice, they will be successful in their claim will depend on the actual circumstances 
of the case, and in particular on the application of the principle of proportionality and 
of fundamental rights. Thus, it might be disproportionate to deny the right to reside to 
a Union citizen who has already established a link with the host territory by virtue of 
having lived there for a certain period of time; who has family ties in the host-territory; 
who has never relied on the host State welfare provision; and who fails to satisfy the 
requirements contained in the Directive only by a small margin (see by analogy the 
ruling in Baumbast).
56
 On the other hand, claiming a Treaty right to reside might be 
considerably more difficult for a person who has no resources at all; a more tenuous 
link with the host-State; and who finds herself in rather more difficult circumstances 




Once a Union citizen is lawfully resident in another Member State, they have a right 
not to be discriminated against on grounds of nationality, pursuant to Article 18 
TFEU
58
 and Article 24(1) Directive 2004/38. However, whilst economically active 
Union citizens, together with those who have acquired the right to permanent 
residency,
59
 enjoy a full right to equal treatment, economically inactive Union citizens 
have more limited rights, so as to shelter national welfare budgets from welfare 
tourism. For this reason Member States might legitimately deny entitlement to social 
assistance and maintenance aid for students to economically inactive Union citizens.
60
 
And yet, this does not mean that a lawfully resident citizen can never get relief from 
the host-State; Article 14 of Directive 2004/38 codifies the principle of 
proportionality as developed in the case law so as to clarify that recourse to social 
assistance cannot automatically lead to expulsion. 
   
A Union citizen (whether or not economically active) who is lawfully resident in the 
host State can be deported only for reasons of public policy and public security;
61
 
                                                 
55
 Following the ruling in Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11635, it was thought that dual 
nationality might also allow claimants to rely on Union citizenship against one of their Member State 
of nationality; however in Case C434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-0000, the Court seems to at least 
considerably limit (if not altogether exclude) the relevance of dual nationality for claiming rights 
against one of the Member States of nationality in case of dual nationality.  
56
 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091. 
57
 Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7574. 
58
 Reproduced in Article 21(2) Charter.  
59
 This is acquired after 5 years of lawful residency; see generally Chapter IV Directive 2004/38.  
60
 Article 24(2) Directive 2004/38. 
61
 As mentioned above, Member States can also rely on the public health derogation in relation to 
restriction to entrance and in the first three months of stay of the Union citizen; however, after that 
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those being derogations from a fundamental Treaty right are interpreted narrowly and 
are subject to the principle of proportionality.
62
 Furthermore, public policy and 
security can only be invoked in relation to the personal conduct of the individual, so 
that reasons of general prevention
63
 cannot be used to justify an expulsion measure. 
64
 
And, the offending personal conduct must represent ‘a genuine, present and sufficient 
threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’.65 This means that not 
only it is difficult for Member States to rely on the derogations unless the conduct in 
question is also sanctioned when performed by nationals,
66
 but also that not all 
criminally sanctioned behaviour can give rise to a deportation order. Hence, expulsion 
can never be the automatic consequence of a custodial sentence
67
 and can never be 
permanent.
68
    
When considering an expulsion measure, Member States are under a Union law 





V. The right to move and claims against the Member State of origin 
 
As mentioned above, the rights detailed in Directive 2004/38 apply only against a 
Member State different from that of nationality. However, the Treaty free movement 
rights, and by implication Article 45(1) Charter, can also be relied upon in order to 
challenge barriers to movement imposed by the Member State of origin. This had 
already been established, to a certain extent, in pre-citizenship case law: thus, 
Member States have never been allowed to impose restrictions on the economic 
migrant’s right to leave their own territory.70 Furthermore, the Court also held that 
Member States could not penalise own migrant citizens upon return to their home 
country;
71
 and that, in certain circumstances, own citizens should be equated to Union 
migrants so as to enjoy Union derived rights.
72
 The same principles apply also post-
citizenship, so that a Member State cannot penalise its own citizens for having moved 
abroad.
73
 However, the broadening of the scope of the Treaty as a result of the 
weakening of the economic link required in order to benefit from rights in Union law, 
also determined a much wider range of situations in which Union citizens might face 
(and challenge) a barrier to movement imposed by their own Member State.  
                                                                                                                                            
initial period Member States can no longer rely on reasons of public health to exclude an individual 
from their territory since either the illness would have been contracted in the host territory; or it would 
have had already the time to spread. Member States can also rely on the derogations to justify imposing 
a prohibition on leaving the national territory, although that is a more rare occurrence; see recently 
Case C-249/11 Byankov, judgment of 4 October 2012, nyr; Case C-434/10 Aladzhov, judgment of 17 
November 2011, nyr; Case C-430/10 Gaydarov, judgment of 17 Novembner 2011, nyr. 
62
 See Arts 27 and 28 Directive 2004/38 codifying pre-existing case law. Rather surprisingly, in recent 
years the Court seems to have taken a broader view of the reasons which might justify expulsion; see 
e.g. Case C-348/09 P.I., judgment of 22 May 2012, nyr.  
63
 In French ordre public which is a narrower concept than public policy.  
64
 See Art 27(2) Dir 2004/38, and Case 67/74 Bonsignore [1975] ECR 297. 
65
 Art 27(2) and before Case 30/77 R v Bouchereau [1978] ECR 1999. 
66
 joined Cases 115 & 116/81 Adoui and Cornuaille v Belgium [1982] ECR 1665. 
67
 Art 33 Dir 2004/38 and Case 30/77 R v Bouchereau [1978] ECR 1999. 
68
 Art 32 Dir 2004/38 and Case C-348/96 Calfa [1999] ECR I-11. 
69
 See Art 30 and ff Directive 2004/38. 
70
 Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377; 
71
 Case C-419/92 Scholz v Opera Universitaria di Cagliari [1994] ECR I-517. 
72
 Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265. 
73
 Case C-224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191. 
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For instance, following the introduction of Union citizenship, any residence 
requirement imposed on benefit claimants now needs to be justified since, by 
definition, a residence requirement is a barrier to movement.
74
 Thus, in Pusa a regime 
which took into account tax paid on a pension in the country of origin but not tax paid 
in the (new) country of residence was found by the Court to be incompatible with 
Article 21 TFEU.
75
  In Nerkowska the payment of a pension granted to civilian war 
victims was made conditional upon residence in the national territory; the Court found 
that there was no justification for such a requirement which hence was incompatible 
with Article 21 TFEU.
76
 On the other hand, in De Cuyper the Court accepted that a 
residence condition imposed on recipients of unemployment benefits was justified by 
the need to monitor compliance with the statutory requirements upon which the 
benefit was dependent.
77
 As a result of Union citizenship, then, any residence 
requirement imposed by the Member State of origin must undergo the necessity and 
proportionality test;
78
 this is not to say, however, that the Court is blind to the needs of 
Member States: hence if the benefit is conditional upon continued assessment of 
entitlement then it is fairly easy for the residence requirement to be justified.  
 
The potential to challenge rules of the Member State of origin does not exhaust itself 
to residence requirements since the Court has construed the scope of the Treaty 
citizenship provisions in a very broad way. In the case of Garcia Avello,
79
 the 
claimants complained about Belgian rules on surnames which prevented children 
having dual Belgian and Spanish nationality to be registered in Belgium according to 
the Spanish custom of including both the father’s and the mother’s surname. The 
Belgian Government argued that the situation lacked an intra-Union link, since the 
case involved Belgian nationals complaining about Belgian rules, and that therefore 
the Treaty did not apply (the children not having yet moved). The Court found that 
dual nationality alone was sufficient to bring the case within the scope of the Treaty 
and that Belgian rules breached the principle of non-discrimination by treating 
citizens with dual nationality in the same way as Belgian only nationals. And that the 
rules could result in a barrier to movement since the children in question might at a 
certain stage want to go to Spain where they might want to use their Spanish surname, 
in which case having certificates and documents under the different Belgian surname 




The case law on barriers imposed by one’s own Member State is possibly that which 
most radically broadens the scope of the Treaty, not least since it contributes to 
further blurring the distinction between areas of national competence and Union law. 
As a result there is no possibility for Member States to erect a fence to protect their 
own national sovereignty and any rule, whatever the subject matter, might fall within 
                                                 
74
 Consistent case law in relation to the Treaty free movement provisions has found that a residence 
requirement is automatically indirectly discriminatory since more likely to be satisfied by own 
nationals than by non nationals; see e.g. Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299. 
75
 Case C-224/02 Pusa [2004] ECR I-5774. 
76
 Case C-499/06 Nerkowska [2008] ECR I-4004. 
77
 Case C-406/04 De Cuyper [2006] ECR I-6971. 
78
 On these issues see G Davies “’Any place I hung my hat?’ or: Residence is the new Nationality” 
(2005) 43 ELJ 11.  
79
 Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11635, see also Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul [2008] 
ECR I-7639. 
80
 In Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-0000, the Court seems to limit considerably the scope of 
Garcia Avello.  
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the scope of the Treaty if it affects in any way the rights of Union citizens to move 




The expansion of the scope of the Treaty as a result of the introduction of the 
citizenship provisions, and the consequent blurring of a neat distinction between 
spheres of influence / competence (if ever there was one), led to questions as to 
whether there was still scope for the purely internal situation rule, according to which 
the Treaty free movement provisions, including citizenship, can only apply when 
there is a intra-European link.
82
 This question is of paramount constitutional 
importance for pragmatic and constitutional reasons alike: factually, it affects the 
extent to which individuals might by-pass their own constitutional processes in order 
to seek judicial review of legislation in relation to proportionality (and fundamental 
rights); constitutionally, it might highlight a further evolution in the European 
integration process towards a more mature, and more intrusive, constitutional system 
where citizens are right holders regardless of their status as migrants. Furthermore, 
and particularly relevant in this context, once a situation falls within the scope of the 
Treaty, the Charter applies, at least to a certain extent. Hence, the broader the scope of 
EU law, the more union citizens will be able to claim Charter rights.  
 
VI. Nature of Charter rights – and purely internal situations 
 
The analysis carried out above focussed on the Court’s interpretation, and the 
legislative elaboration, of the Treaty rights which are reproduced in the Charter. 
However, and as mentioned earlier, it should be remembered that differently from 
Treaty rights, Charter rights are not free standing. In other words, in order to rely on a 
Charter right a claimant must have already brought themselves within the scope of the 
Treaty or of Union law. In the former case, the claimant would rely directly on the 
Treaty, since the Charter free movement right does not add (or subtract) anything 
from the Treaty provision it reproduces. However, it might be wondered whether 
there is space for an autonomous role of Article 45 (1) Charter in those cases in which 
the Member State is implementing Union law; or when the action is directed against a 
Union institution. It should be made clear from the inception that both situations are 
also covered by the Treaty: when a Member State is implementing Union law it has to 
exercise its discretion compatibly with the Treaty; and the same can be said about 
Union institutions. Rather, the issue is whether it could be argued that, differently 
from the Treaties, the Charter might also be relevant in purely internal situations since 
the cross-border rationale appears to be immaterial to Charter rights. So, take by 
means of example, the situation in which a Member State in implementing EU law 
imposes a residence requirement in a given municipal location in order to be eligible 
for a given benefit. It would be, at least theoretically, possible for an individual to 
claim that such a restriction is a breach of Article 45(1) without having to also 
establish an intra-Union link, i.e. the potential intention to move in another Member 
State. Since the Charter’s aims are not the same as the Treaties’ aims, restricting its 
field of application to cross-border situations might be considered inconsistent with 
                                                 
81
 Not relevant in this context since it relates to Article 20 TFEU as foundational of Union citizenship, 
is the case  law which further blurs the distinction between purely internal situation and situation of 
Union relevance by limiting the ability of Member States to act in a way which might deprive Union 
citizens of the enjoyment of the substance of the rights attaching to Union citizenship, see Case C-
34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177; and Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449.   
82
 Literature on purely internal  
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the idea of meaningful protection of citizens’ (and not just migrants’) rights. On the 
other hand, it could also be argued, and as mentioned at the beginning of this 
contribution, that Article 52(2) Charter constitutes an absolute bar to an autonomous 
life of Treaty derived rights. In any event, the circumstances in which such an 
autonomous interpretation would be of use are rather marginal. 
  
E. Article 45(2) 
 
So far we have focussed on the right to move and reside enshrined in the first 
paragraph of article 45 Charter. This, as explained above, is confined to Union 
citizens. The second paragraph of the same article, on the other hand, is addressed to 
non-Union citizens and states that movement and residence rights may be granted in 
accordance to the Treaties to legally resident third country nationals. The reference to 
‘legal residence’ as a pre-condition for enjoyment of rights makes this provision 
particularly relevant to those TCNs who have no family ties with migrant Union 
citizens. In the case of the latter, rights are derived from the Union citizen – in a way 
they are instrumental to maximising the citizen’s enjoyment of their own right to 
move - and for this reason there is no lawful residence requirement.
83
  On the other 
hand, Article 45(2) simply recalls the fact that, since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
Union might grant rights to move and reside to third country nationals.
84
 Measures 
adopted in this context include for instance those giving effect to the Schengen area;
85
 
common immigration policy and the like. As mentioned in the introduction, this 




As discussed above, it is very unlikely that Article 45 would be of direct relevance to 
Union citizens since Article 45(2) seems not justiciable, whilst Article 45(1) merely 
reproduces existing Treaty provisions. Hence, the remedies available to individuals 
whose right to free movement has been breached would be those available in the case 
of breaches of Treaty provisions. As a result, should an institution have breached the 
free movement right, it would be liable for damages insofar as the provisions relating 
to the non contractual liability of the Union would be applicable.
86
 In the case of a 
                                                 
83
 See Case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-6241. 
84
 E.g. Directive 2003/109 concerning the status of third country nationals who are long term residents 
[2003] OJ L 16/44, amended by Directive 2011/51 [2011] L 132/1, consolidated version http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2003L0109:20110520:EN:PDF; on barriers 
to movement in this context see Case C-508/10 Commission v Netherlands, judgment of 26 April 2012, 
nyr; Directive 2009/50 on the conditions of entry and residence for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment (Blue Card Directive) [2009] L 155/17; Directive 2004/114 on the conditions of 
admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated 
training or voluntary service [2004] OJ L 375/12; Directive 2005/71 on a specific procedure for 
admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research [2005] OJ L 289/15. For a 
critique of the Union policy on free movement of TCNs see A Wiesbrock “Free  movement of third-
country nationals in the European Union: the illusion of inclusion” (2010) 35 ELRev 455. 
85
 See e.g. Regulation 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement 
of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (2006) OJ L 105/1. 
86
 See generally A A Dashwood, M Dougan, B Roger, E Spaventa and D Wyatt Wyatt and 
Dashwood’s European Union Law (6th edition, 2011, Hart Publishing), Chapter 6 section V. 
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breach caused by the Member State, Francovich damages would be available 






Article 45 Charter is not set to be one of the ‘revolutionary’ provisions of the Charter 
and one might wonder whether it will ever be subjected to interpretation by the Court 
of Justice. The reasons for this are clear: the first paragraph of the Article reproduces 
verbatim one of the central provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. Given the subserviency of Charter rights to their original sources, 
and given that the Treaty rights, unlike the Charter equivalent, are free standing, it is 
difficult to imagine situations in which an individual might benefit from reliance on 
Article 45(1) Charter rather than on Articles 20/21 TFEU. The same can be said in 
relation to the obligation to respect the Charter imposed on Union institutions and 
Member States when implementing Union law, since institutions and Member States 
are equally bound by the Treaties. It would be surprising, then, if the Court were to 
rely on the Charter right with preference to the Treaties in those situations. Article 
45(2) seems also of little practical relevance since, as mentioned above, it is 
declaratory in character and it is difficult to foresee a situation in which it could be 
justiciable.  
 
This of course, begs the question as to why those rights, which at best merely 
duplicate existing provisions, were introduced at all. The answer is not difficult to 
gauge: the Charter was drafted without knowledge of its future position amongst the 
sources of Union law; the drafting Convention did not know what its legal status 
would be; and whether it would be incorporated in the Treaties; whether it would be 
an Annex therein; or whether it would exist in a parallel dimension. Furthermore, in 
drafting the Charter the aim was to make rights more visible, and the Cologne 
mandate explicitly provided that the Charter should contain the rights pertaining to 
Union citizens.
88
 And it is not surprising that, if the intention was to create a 
comprehensive catalogue of rights recognised by the European Union, those rights 
which are directly granted by the Union and that are central to its project and 
functioning, could not be omitted. Thus, the fact that those rights are of little practical 
relevance should not detract from the symbolic importance of their inclusion in the 
Union fundamental rights instrument. It might not matter much that those rights are 
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 See generally A A Dashwood, M Dougan, B Roger, E Spaventa and D Wyatt Wyatt and 
Dashwood’s European Union Law (6th edition, 2011, Hart Publishing), Chapter 9 section VC. 
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 Presidency Conclusions, Cologne 3 and 4 June 1999, 150/99 REV 1, Annex IV. 
